Journal of Pedagogy, Pluralism, and Practice
Volume 5 | Issue 1

Article 6

Fall 2013

The Dynamics of Ethnic Identity in Iranian
Azerbaijan
Fereydoun Safizadeh

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lesley.edu/jppp
Recommended Citation
Safizadeh, Fereydoun (2013) "The Dynamics of Ethnic Identity in Iranian Azerbaijan," Journal of Pedagogy, Pluralism, and Practice: Vol.
5 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lesley.edu/jppp/vol5/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Lesley. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Pedagogy,
Pluralism, and Practice by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@Lesley. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lesley.edu.

Safizadeh: The Dynamics of Ethnic Identity in Iranian Azerbaijan

The Dynamics of Ethnic Identity in Iranian Azerbaijan
Fereydoun Safizadeh

Introduction
The population in Iran has doubled since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and today it stands at
nearly 75 million. Iran has a multiethnic, multi-tribal, multilingual, multicultural and multireligious society. In addition to the historic Persian-Iranian identity, the population has a
multi-layered and multi-faceted cultural, linguistic, tribal, religious, regional identification
and affiliations. The diversity of society harks back to an earlier era, prior to the imposition of
either/or dichotomous principles of ethnic nationalism at the turn of 20th century in Europe
and elsewhere. Today, this dichotomous envisioning of society is best exemplified by the
figure such as the one below where you have a highly simplified chart representing the
composition of the society that is ethnographically unable to capture any of the multifaceted and the multi-layered dimensions of group identity in Iran.

Persians, Azerbaijani Turks, Gilaki, Mazandaranis, Turkmen, Kurds, Lurs, Baluch, Arabs, but
also others with tribal affiliations such as Bakhtiari, Qashqa’i, Shahsavan, Turkoman and
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smaller tribes, and various religious affiliations such as Armenians Christians, Assyrians,
Baha’i, Chaldeans, Isma’ilis, Jews, Shi’a Muslims, Sufis, Sunni Muslims, Zoroastrians and
other smaller sects such as Ahl-e Haqq or Ali Allahis and other regional groupings have lived
and coexisted with one another for centuries.
Persians are the largest ethnic group (approximately 51%) inhabiting the provinces of
Tehran, Esfahan, Fars, Khorasan, Yazd, Kerman, Bushehr, Hormozgan, Markazi (Arak), Qom,
Gilan, Mazandaran, Semnan, Qazvin, the majority of Hamadan province including the city of
Hamadan, majority of the North Khorasan, majority of Khuzestan province, Eastern parts of
Lorestan province (Borujerd), northern half of Sistan and Baluchistan (Zabol), southern and
western half of Golestan province including the provincial capital of Gorgan, eastern half of
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari including the city of Shahrekord.
Persians form also at least half of the populations in the bilingual cities of Kermanshah, Ahvaz
and Zahedan. The younger generations of Lur, Bakhtiari, Kermanshahis along with the Shia
Kurds, Shia Arabs and the Sunni Baluchs often consider themselves to be Persians and
generally speak the dialect of the capital Tehran.
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The Iranian Azerbaijanis, also known as Azeris or the Turkish-speakers are located in the
province of West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, Qazvin, Tehran, Hamadan and
Kurdistan. Figure: 2 indicates where the Iranian Turkish-speakers Azeris are located in the
majority and minority. Iranian Azerbaijanis are primarily Shi’a Muslims, and are the second
largest ethnic group in Iran after the Persians (24%) although Turkic speakers include others
such as the Turkoman and the Qashqa’i people who live in other parts of Iran. Prior to the
20th century, and the Pahlavi period, the identity of Iran was supra-ethnic, although much of
the political leadership since 11th century had been Turkic. Some scholars have argued that
the Iranian Azerbaijanis are an Iranian people similar to Kurds who speak a Turkic language
due to a process called "language displacement" or “Turkification” of their language that
happened around 15-16th century. The Russian invasion and annexation of Iranian lands in
south Caucasus (Treaty of Golestan 1813, Turkomenchay 1828) set in motion the beginnings
of an ethno-national consciousness not only in the lands under Russian and later Soviet
control, but among the Turkish-speakers in northwest Iran. Despite this ethnic consciousness
and identity Iranian Azerbaijanis are rather well represented at all levels of political, military,
religious and intellectual life of Iran. The city of Tehran is said to be the largest Turkishspeaking city in Iran with 20-30 percent Turkish-speakers or persons of Azerbaijani extraction.
Since the start of Pahlavi rule in Iran in 1925 and the concern with the ideologies of
nationalism in the post-Ottoman period, education in Persian language was seen as an
important national unifying force in the country which began to overshadow the multilingual
nature of society at that time. The consequence of such thinking and policy for Turkishspeakers, as well as others groups such as Kurds, have been that they have not been allowed
to formally learn their language in schools. In the case of Iranian Azerbiajanis, since the
Islamic revolution in 1979, some Turkish newspapers and radio programs have been allowed,
but with the break up of Soviet Union, Iranian government’s concern over irredentist
tendencies have grown. Today, some of Iran's Azerbaijanis are striving for language right,
better cultural recognition and more appreciation of minority rights.
The Islamic Revolution, the 1980 American hostage crisis, the eight year war with Iraq, and
the on-going hostilities in the realm of international relations has set Iran on a course of
development that is in a daily contentious relationship with the United States, Europe and
Israel. Particularly, the development of atomic energy has been an issue in the forefront of
international political relations. The United States and Israel have been threatening to bomb
Iran’s nuclear facilities, while Iran counteracted that the development of nuclear energy is
their national right according to the terms of None-Proliferation Treaty. Within this larger
context are the national and international implications for Iran’s ethnic, linguistic and
cultural diversity and their relationship to each other with the government as the ultimate
arbiter. This article is an ethnographic examination of the dynamics of the relationship
between Turkish-speakers and the Persian-speakers following the Cockroach Cartoon
incident and the turmoil that followed it in the spring of 2006.
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This is a sensitive time in Iran’s history. It is not clear what is in store for Iran. In as much as
there are plans to possibly use bunker buster atomic devices to get at nuclear sites in Iran,
there are also plans to use ethnic tensions as “internal atomic bombs” in “democracy
operations” and “regime change” in Iran. It has been said that if Khuzistan, the oil producing
province, is separated from Iran and turned into another Kuwait, Iran will be finished. Thus, it
is important to find out what are the “ethnic” issues and regional grievances and to stop the
simplifications that go on.
In Iranian Azerbaijan the answer to my question “Is There Anyone in Iranian Azerbaijan Who
Wants to Get a Passport to Go to Mashad, Qum, Isfahan or Shiraz?”(1) remains no, even after
the May 2006 Cockroach Cartoon unrest.(2) My fieldwork findings(3) in Tabriz between
January and July of the same year, categorically underscores this response. Of course, if you
listen to some international broadcasting on Telestar or the Turkish Satellites(4) you may
think otherwise. But the truth is that when one reaches the final question “Do you want to get
a passport to go to Mashad, Qum, Isfahan or Shiraz?,” even the most ardent of Azerbaijani
rights advocates go through a reality check and reply that they are not talking about
separation from Iran. Now that this important question has been answered, maybe we
should stop worrying about Azerbaijani minority problems in Iran. But in fact, this has exactly
been the problem and the pattern in dealing or better said, in not dealing, with ethnic
minority issues in Iran and in the Turkish-speaking provinces in particular. So, what can be
said that sheds some new light on the relationship of Turkish and Persian-speaking people
and communities in Iran?
It should also be said that in referring to Turkish-speakers in this paper I am only referring to
the people in northwest Iran, and not the Turkmen or the Qashqai people, who are important
Turkic speaking peoples in other parts of Iran.

Some Basic Questions about Iranian Azerbaijan
The first issue is locating Azerbaijan geo-politically and culturally. Geo-politically this is an
obvious question with the various provincial divisions going back to the time of Reza Shah
(1925-1941) (5) and even earlier. The northern and the western boundaries of this area are
clear, the international borders with the Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Armenia
(previously USSR), and Turkey. The southern boundary is somewhat diffused with Kurdish,
Turkmen and Persian-speaking people, with a significant number of Turkish-speakers in and
around the city of Hamadan. The eastern and southeastern borders of this cultural area has
in recent years been pushed into the cities of Karaj and even into the capital, Tehran, where a
low of 25% and a high of 40% are Turk, Azeri or Azerbaijani, or an extraction of Turkishspeakers. As far as many local people in northwest Iran are concerned, it is not absolutely
clear whether the raison d’etre for the present provincial divisions into East Azerbaijan, West
Azerbaijan, Ardabil and Zanjan are simply because of administrative needs and logistics.
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Culturally, as the recent Cockroach Cartoon unrest has demonstrated, the make up of Iranian
Azerbaijan is inclusive of all Turkish-speaking areas in northwest Iran. There were antiCockroach Cartoon demonstrations in Tabriz, Urmieh, Ardabil, Zanjan, and in numerous
other smaller cities in all the four Turkish-speaking provinces. Many people in all Turkishspeaking areas found the Iran newspaper(6) sousk, Cockroach Cartoon offensive and reacted
strongly to it.
The second question has to do with the politics and poetics of the terms Turk, Azeri or
Azerbaijani. A minimum of twenty million or so native Turkish-speakers refer to themselves as
Turks. They do not see why others insist on referring to them as something other.
Anthropology tells us that generally we should stick to the emic categories, that is, native
categories of thinking and understanding of a particular local group that are meaningful to
them (Barrand 2002. Interestingly, a meeting was held in Tehran about the May 2006
Cockroach Cartoon unrest by journalists of Iran and Shargnewspapers(7), Turkish-speaking
colleagues were specifically invited to assess the impact of the Mana Neyistani sousk,
Cockroach Cartoon, on writers and editors own ethnic, cultural and linguistic sensitivities and
sensibilities when publishing about minority populations(8). It was suggested by the Turkishspeaking journalists, that a first step is, to call Turkish-speakers Turks, as they themselves do,
and not keep referring to them as Azeri or Azeri-speakers, which has become the
nomenclature of the print world in Iran particularly since the Islamic revolution. The term
Azeri has found a fashionable currency for distinguishing Iranian Azerbaijanis or Turkishspeakers from those in Turkey and the post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and other groups in
Iran. Yet the test of the native usage is, when two Iranian Azerbaijanis or Turkish-speakers not
knowing a third person, will ask each other whether that the third person is a “Turk or a Fars”
(a Turk or a Persian), not “an Azeri or a Fars”, or of another ethnic group, such as Armenian,
Assyrian or a Kurd(9).
The third question has to do with historical and political issues. Invariably, when discussing
Iranian Azerbaijani and Turkish-speaking issues or identity, the discussion takes on a
specifically historical and political dimension, with the usual cast of topics such as: the Turkic
invasion of Iran, whether Iranian Azerbaijanis are Turks or Azeri, if their language is Turkish or
Azeri, whether Azeri is actually a dialect of Persian still spoken in its original form in remote
villages of Iranian and even Republic of Azerbaijan, or issues relating to various social and
political movements in Iranian Azerbaijan(10), such as the Constitutional Movement or the
Movements by the anti-colonialist Shaikh Mohammad Khiabani (1920), or the Democratic
Party of Azerbaijan, the Peoples Government of Azerbaijan by Seyyed Ja’far Pishevari (1946).
Accurate and multi-dimensional understanding of these historical events and periods is
extremely important. But they have become a substitute for understanding the
contemporary conditions of life in the larger Iranian Azerbaijan and the Turkish-speaking
areas. What is real today is that at least twenty million or more people live and work in that
part of Iran with a particular language, customs and a way of cultural practice, some of which
are very much like any other people in Iran, and others which are not. What these people
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want is an empathetic understanding, respect and acknowledgement, and an end to the
denial and erasure of their particularities, and an end to the continual ridicule and
stereotyping of their ways, culture, language or their accents.
The fourth issue continues to be in the area of language. For Iranian Azerbaijanis, language is
an important marker of distinctiveness and identity. Such high level of language
consciousness is barely a hundred years old. Previously educated people in Iranian
Azerbaijan were multilingual in several languages: Turkish, Persian, Arabic, Kurdish, Assyrian,
Armenian, or even Russian or a European language. The majority of common folk were
generally monolingual, the majority as Turkish-speakers, but some were multilingual in
Kurdish, Assyrian and Armenian as well. The primary cause of linguistic distinctiveness or
identity has been the result of the 20th century nationalistic efforts to homogenize the
population of Iran through Persian language education for better integration of the diverse
peoples of the country(11).
Iranian Azerbaijanis have been in a unique position linguistically. They are content and happy
to do their talking in Turkish, their writing in Persian and their religion in Arabic. But their
capacity for multi-lingual living is being challenged both internally and externally with eitheror choices in the name of national identity or ethno-national consciousness. What you find on
the ground is resistance to both these homogenizing options.
The key issues in the area of language are: 1) mother tongue, and what this entails in terms of
thinking, expression, and comfort of communication; 2) the experience of second language
acquisition, and the issue of fluency and accent; and 3) the social issues and dynamics
related to knowing another language, in this case Persian.
For most urban Iranian Azerbaijanis speaking Turkish as mother-tongue, Persian has been a
second language, and for many rural individuals, it is a very recent second language.
Exposure to Persian has changed in the last forty years with the presence of radio and
television, nevertheless, language issues are present for every family with children. How to
facilitate the learning of a second language, and the feelings that individual mothers and
fathers have about the forced nature of having to insure that their children learn Persian so
that they succeed better in school and in the country as a whole is a matter of important
concern. Persian-speakers do not appreciate the second language acquisition achievements
of the Iranian Azerbaijanis. This is because few of them learn the languages of other
minorities in Iran. Turkish-speaking Iranians have more in common with their Persianspeaking compatriots when the Persian compatriots have to learn another language, such as
English, in a foreign country. While probing the question of “how does language, such as a
different language or accent, shape one’s feelings about different people”, an informant of
mine reacted with his own question “is there an negative attitude about minority languages
and cultures in Iran?”, and answered his own question, “from the jokes about the Turkishspeakers and their accents, one would have to say yes."
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The issue of mutual intelligibility or unintelligibility is an important subject in any multiethnic and multi-cultural society. In Iran, a fair amount of miscommunication, conflict,
animosity and hostility revolves around this reality. It is here that the social usefulness of the
jokes and stereotypes about Turks or Turkish-speakers becomes evident. When Persianspeakers with a historically privileged sense of self and culture cannot understand the
minority, the Turk becomes the numskull or khar, the donkey. The figure of donkey is an
important one for defining the attributes of the Other. I asked my informant if he had a joke
that I might use in my paper. He promptly came up with one which I found distasteful, and
decided not to use. I censored myself. But later, I thought the joke exemplifies the distasteful
nature of many jokes that Persian-speakers often tell about Turkish-speakers and Turkishspeakers sometimes tell about Persian-speakers.
“Two friends were walking along a river and they hear a donkey braying and passing gas once
in a while. The Persian-speaker tells the Turkish-speaker that the donkey is speaking Turkish.
The Turkish-speaker laughs and responds, it is true, but the problem is that the donkey is
mixing in Persian once in a while."
This is a balanced joke. Often jokes are highly one sided and just as stinging. The famous
British anthropologist, Radcliffe-Brown (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965) has explained that a joking
relationship is a kind of friendliness expressed by a show of hostility. It is only “sham
hostility” and the parties are not expected to take offense. Nevertheless, a joking relationship
symbolically recognizes the separateness between two groups, and the potential for conflict.
But at the same time, it obligates the parties to interact in a friendly way with one another,
thus, actually minimizing the chance that conflict will occur.
Such functional explanations aside, it is how the jokes and stereotyping engages the other
that matters, especially when there are grounds for misunderstanding and
miscommunication, about important issues, such as politics, religion, loyalty or economic
rights. This is the concern in Iran today. The fact that Persian-speakers tell jokes about many
people in Iran is not a good answer for bad taste, and disrespectful behavior, which for the
sake of national interest, security and decency is unnecessary.
The Sousk, Cockroach, Cartoon and the Streets of Tabriz
This brings me to the subject of the latest round of so-called unpremeditated offenses against
a minority population in Iran which is supposed to be cute, just a cartoon for kids and not big
deal! So, what was the Friday May 12, 2006Iran newspaper Jomeh edition, cartoon by Mana
Neyistani about, and why did it lead to such an unrest on Monday May 22nd in northwest
Iran(12)?
Most people will hardly have paid enough attention to the actual cartoon, and may be
puzzled why a children’s cartoon caused such a region-wide protest and unrest that lasted
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almost a week, left at least four persons dead, many injured, and an unknown number of
persons arrested and imprisoned. Initial calls for an apology by various groups in Iranian
Azerbaijan went unheard for a week by the newspaper. Finally, the newspaper’s negative
reaction to the call for an apology was published on Monday May 22nd (1385/3/1) which
triggered the afternoon demonstrations in Tabriz.
It is worth paying close attention to the actual cartoon. The title of the cartoon story was Che
Konim Ke Sousk ha Souskemoon Nakonand, (What Should We Do so that the Cockroaches
Don’t Turn Us into Cockroaches). The story begins “it is the month of Khordad (June-July),
and with the coming of summer heat come the cockroaches. In the past several years a new
“veersion” (the English word is written in Persian in the cartoon) of cockroaches has arrived
that are four-season cockroaches, and are not affected by heat or cold” (the new version of
cockroaches have evidently arrived in Iran via air travel). The story continues that “it is that
time of the year that the old and new “veersion” cockroaches come out of the toilet scaring
poor little Sara, who runs to her mother screaming maman sousk, sousk…” The cartoonist
states that “… in dealing with cockroaches … one should not adopt violence, because it
takes the fun out of it. In a civilized way, we should sit at a table and have a dialogue with
them.” He continues, “Unfortunately, the cockroaches do not understand human language,
and the grammar of their own language is so difficult that 80% of them prefer to speak the
language of others.” The cartoonist continues “when cockroaches do not understand their
own language, how do you expect them to understand us. It is at this point that dialogue
comes to an end, and you have to resort to more violent ways."
The first cartoon plate shows Sara and the cockroach sitting at a table with Sara attempting
to speak with the cockroach, and the cockroach replying in Turkish (but written in Latin
letters) “Namana” or “what.” With this plate establishing the cockroach as a Turkish-speaker,
the eight other plates go on graphically and distastefully to discuss how the cockroaches live
in toilets and eat human waste and so on, and how a civilized person should deal with them.
If one is a Turk, an Azerbaijani, a Turkish-speaker or an “Azeri”, and reads the cartoon
carefully, it is not difficult to get offended. With close attention, it also becomes clear that this
cartoonist has neither Iranian nor Western sensibilities. He is caught in the twilight zone of
two or more cultures, and in a position to play with people’s feelings, in this case, the feelings
of Iranian Turkish-speakers. As one informant reacted “he needs to sit in jail and drink some
cold water (think), and stating that it is just a kid’s cartoon is not an acceptable answer."
What happened in Iranian Azerbaijan in the week following the publication of the cartoon,
and how it can be interpreted is another problem. Given that ethnic and minority issues are
highly sensitive in Iran these days, just getting an outline of what exactly happened was a
challenge.
What is clear is that the unrest, at least in Tabriz, was minimally organized, and it started on
university campuses where students photocopied the cartoon page and circulated it and
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demanded an apology. Through word of mouth, word spread about the cartoon. The
extensive use of mobile telephone and text messaging was so effective that the authorities
suspended mobile service for several days. The initial city wide demonstration began around
4:00 pm on Monday May 22nd near Rasteh Kuche Street, Maydan-e Namaz (Prayer Square), in
front of the Bazaar, and around Tabriz University. Tabriz bazaar was shut down early while
shopkeepers and others joined demonstrations heading towards the Governor General's
office. The Governor General and his deputies elected not to come out and respond to the
marchers which further aggravated the demonstrators. The bazaar protesters flowed into a
major artery in the city, and were joined by numerous other groups heading towards Tabriz
University. Similarly, other groups were heading down from the University area into the city
center. When the two groups met at a major intersection (Chahar Rah-e Ab-e Rasaan), they
were confronted by security forces using tear gas and clubs to halt and disperse the
marchers, and violence broke out. The confrontations lead to the burning of police vehicles,
banks and the breaking of shop windows. Clashes took place throughout the city for the next
several days while special riot forces had to be flown in from Tehran. They were reinforced
with irregular brown-shirt type forces from outside of the city, that were housed in mosques
for several nights and supplied with chains, cables and clubs for beating marchers,
demonstrators and innocent bystanders. The marchers and demonstrators received an
unusually violent beating as the security forces rounded up individuals believed to be
instigators and ring leaders. Rumors spread that Persian and non-Turkish-speaking forces
had been flown in to deal with the situation. Similar violent confrontations took place in the
city of Urmieh, where the state television station was set afire. Demonstrations and marches
also took place in Miyandoab, Marand, Ahar, Ardabil, Miyaneh, Zanjan, and many other cities
and towns. Demonstrations were particularly violent in Marand and Ardabil.
The main demand of the demonstrators was an apology from the Irannewspaper and the
cartoonist. Given that the Iran newspaper is the official organ of the Iranian government
itself, the apology took on a slightly different meaning. When the apology finally came, it was
too little too late. By that time the protest had gathered so much momentum that only an
acknowledgement, a statement or an apology from the Government and the Supreme
Leader, rahbar, Ayatollah Khamneie, was going to suffice. Once the government realized the
extent of the unrest and the potential for its continuance, the Tehran judiciary quickly took
steps to shut down the Iran newspaper, and jailed the paper’s editor and the cartoonists
(Mehrdad Qasimfar and Mana Neyistani) on the charges that they had offend the Iranian
Azerbaijanis, caused mayhem and exposed the country to foreign instigations. Mr. Haddad
Adel, the Speaker of the Parliament, appeared on national television, in one of the
Azerbaijani-Ardabili mosques in Tehran and praised all Azerbaijanis for their support of the
revolution, the war (Iraq War 1980-88) and for their patriotism. Finally, rahbar, Ayatollah
Khamenei himself addressed the nation on May 28th on the events in Azerbaijan, praising
again the “Azeri-speaking” Iranians for their religiosity, patriotism and industry, and blamed
the foreign hands in fomenting the unrest. Speaking in Turkish (with an accent) he offered his
own and the government’s version of the demonstrator’s slogans: “Azerbaijan-e Jaanbaz
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Ingilabdan Arlirmaz”(Patriotic Azerbaijan will not separate from the Islamic Revolution),
and “Azerbaijan Oyakhdi Inglaba Dayakhdi” (Azerbaijan is Awake and Depends on the
Revolution). The demonstrator’s quickly responded with “Azerbaijan Oyakhdi Oz Dilina
Dayakhdi, Farslar Biza Gonakhdi,” “Azerbaijan Oyakhdi Oz Dinina Dayakhdi” (Azerbaijan is
awake and depends on its own language and religion; Persians are our guests). A more
economically oriented slogan was “Soghan, Yeralma bir Quimat, Mivada bir Quimat, Dash
Bashuwa bi Geyrat”(onion, potato one price, fruit another price, …) or a more ultranationalistically oriented slogan was “Fars, Russ, Ermani, Azerbajan Doushmani” (Persian,
Russian, Armenian enemies of Azerbaijan). Once again, the primary blame was put on foreign
countries and their agents for causing unrest and turmoil among a minority population in
Iran.
Eventually, the head of East Azerbaijan Judiciary(13) announced that in East Azerbaijan
alone, 330 persons were arrested, eighty to eighty-five persons for being ring leaders of the
demonstrations and marches, another 20-25 persons, for being key instigators of violence. A
number of the key instigators were said to be of the Bahai religion and or communists and
two individuals to have ties to the State of Israel. Another 50 individuals were to be tried for
throwing rocks and damaging public or private property. He also indicated that 9 and 15
persons were arrested in the cities of Marand and Ahar respectively. The number of how
many were arrested in the other Turkish-speaking provinces was uncertain.
The government and the authorities elected a three pronged approach to the Azerbaijan
unrest. While the security forces dealt extremely harshly with the participants in the
demonstrations and marches with beatings, arrests and instilling of fear, in national
newspapers, radio and television there was a short lived public relations campaign of
formulaic praise to allay the feeling of Iranian Azerbaijanis. This was combined with arrests of
journalists, and blocking the distribution of local papers, thus, choking off any discussion in
the local media of what had just happened, and the causes of such spontaneous protests and
unrest.
Obviously, attributing such public protests and demonstrations to the publication of a
cartoon is a simplification of the issues and problems facing the people of Iranian Azerbaijan.
Clearly, the cartoon was seen as "tahgir" or insult to the identity of Turkish-speaking people.
On the other hand, people talked of economic disparity, regional underdevelopment,
and hoviyat zedaii,obsession with identity, both Persian and Turkish, as the main causes for
the surfacing of dormant dissatisfactions. Many informants argued that the causes of unrest
in Iranian Azerbaijan should not be sought on the other side of the Iranian borders, but in the
wrong and unfair policies of the government and the local administrators. Some wondered
why it was that with such economic, social and cultural potential, Iranian Azerbaijan was
among the less-developed provinces of Iran. Others asked which economic policies were
responsible for budget allocation for East, West Azerbaijan and Ardabil provinces that
combined were less than the budget for some other provinces such as Kerman or Yazd. At a
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conference in Tehran two days after the start of the Azerbaijan unrest on Tanavo’e Farhanghi
va Hambasteghi Melli, (Cultural Diversity and National Unity) on Wednesday May 24, 2006 Mr.
Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated that the cause of Azerbaijan unrest was “za’f-e tadbir” or weak
policies and management(14). The reformists (“2 Khordadis”) believe such unrest was
unlikely to happen under their watch as their handling of the situation would have been
much more professional and sensitive. Only one newspaper, Etemad Melli, in a front page
article, criticized the Minister of Interior, the government spokesperson, and the security
forces for blaming foreign countries and their agents(15). The article asked how powerful can
foreign hands be to have caused such unrest in Khuzistan, Sistan, Baluchistan, Kerman, and
now in larger Azerbaijan (four Turkish-speaking provinces), or to have orchestrated the
cartoon and its publication, as well as the crash of C-130 airplane killing high level Sepah
Pasdaran, Revolutionary Guard personnel. If indeed, foreign agents have been able to cause
all of these events, then what have the security and intelligence forces and the political
authorities been doing all this time? The article continued, assigning the weakness in
management and policies of the government to the work of foreign agents as offensive to the
people of Iran, especially to the already offended people of Azerbaijan.
At the local level, recrimination had started between various authorities, particularly from the
Tabriz Mayor(16) as to who should have done what, when and where to prevent the
escalation of the unrest and violence. He was critical of the governor of East Azerbaijan(17)
and stated that if he had come out of his office and not been afraid, and had attempted to
lead and manage the protesters, it is possible that the events would not have gotten out of
hand and turned violent. Without orders from Tehran, it is unthinkable that the Governor
General could have done anything on his own. What was clear was that no one was going to
take responsibility for anything. The local newspapers were warned not to “act against the
interests of the state” and “not to prolong the subject”, and they did a good job dancing
around the issue.

President Ahmadinejad’s Trip to East Azerbaijan
For sometime there had been an on-going expectation regarding if and when President
Ahmadinejad was going to pay his official visit to the province of East Azerbaijan. Without
much notice, the president started his visit to East Azerbaijan, the 16th on his list of provincial
visits, on July 12, 2006. He began his four day stay with a major speech in Tabriz at the Bagh
Shomal/Takhti, Stadium to which everyone had been invited, summoned, and bussed to
from various government offices, factories, etc. As Imam Jomeh of Tabriz(18) and other local
dignitaries welcomed the president and listed the needs of the city and the province, what
was most noticeable was the President’s choreographed attention to Zionism and its western
supporters at the international level, and to the needs of young men, and especially young
women at the local level. Over the next four days President Ahmadinejad visited most other
provincial cities and some small towns, at each stop adding more details to the general
outline of issues raised in the Tabriz speech. In every city or town a sport hall was promised
both to young men and young women, as well as public assistance for getting married(19). In
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as much as the larger Azerbaijan unrest was blamed on foreign hands, the government was
keenly attempting to appease the young men and women, and to address some local needs.
As job creation for the young men and women is much more difficult to achieve, the
government was doing what was practical, to keep the young busy and off the streets,
particularly through sports and the marriage option.
Iranian Azerbaijanis continue to be in a difficult position. First, is their economic and political
dissatisfactions, second, is their cultural dissatisfactions relating to Persian ethnocentricity
that has permeated the government’s relationship with all minorities. Also, there are the ever
present unwanted hands of foreign influence and governments such as that of the Republic
of Azerbaijan, Turkey, United States and Israel. Azerbaijani ultra-nationalism is in part fed by
the forces in the Republic of Azerbaijan, similarly, Pan-Turkic ideas are fed by forces in
Turkey, and a variety of ideas and issues emanate from the United States and Israel directed
at Iranian Azerbaijanis and other minority populations in Iran. Many right wing think tanks in
United States are openly advocating using the ethnic tensions to destabilize Iran. Similar
advocacy can be read in the work of Israeli analysts, who see Iran as one of the last dynastic
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural states left in the Middle East ripe for another case of
federalism. And there are the satellite broadcasts seeking to further democracy and bring
about regime change in Iran. Take the case of previously mentioned international
broadcasting on Telestar and Turkish Satellites targeting the Iranian Azerbaijanis. Whether
they receive US government support or not is irrelevant, many Iranian Azerbaijanis believe
that they are partially US government supported operations especially when the US Congress
allocates millions of dollars to further “democracy operations” and regime change in Iran.
These broadcasts spouse anti-regime and anti-Persian propaganda, and call for
demonstrations of one kind or another at a given place in Tabriz or other cities in Iranian
Azerbaijan. For example, in early March 2006 some called for the people of Tabriz to gather at
Chahr Rah-e (intersection) of Khomeini and Shariati Street to march towards the Khalifegari,
the Armenian social club, to demonstrate against the small number of Armenian households
left in Tabriz. The Armenians took refuge in their homes for several days to wait out the
storm. Except for the few who heeded the call (several hundred), most people I spoke with in
Tabriz found this event to be an utter disgrace, instigated by uninformed and dislocated
Azerbaijanis, Iranians, or others, located half way around the world. The first casualties of this
type of democracy-promoting broadcasting are often the defenseless small minorities, in this
case the Christian population of Tabriz, who have generally been much appreciated for their
industry and citizenship. Individuals sitting behind these microphones with access to the
latest satellite technologies are often irresponsible ethnic wheeler dealers playing with local
peoples’ lives, and in the process gaining a good deal of ill will towards the United States and
its allies.
To sum up, hardly anyone in Iranian Azerbaijan wants to get a passport to go to Mashad,
Qum, Isfahan or Shiraz even despite the sousk, Cockroach Cartoons. As an informant put it:
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“we should remember that nothing is forever, like a good marriage, Turkish-speaking Persianspeaking relations need to be cared for, just as the heterogeneity of Iran, Iranian Azerbaijan and
Tabriz needs to be appreciated and preserved. With such expansive land to live and work in, oil,
gas, people with different languages, cultures and religions why would I want to separate and
join somewhere else when I have it all. I should appreciate and care for the gift I have. All we
want is our language and ways to be better appreciated by the powers to be. We are not going
any where, there is no need to fear our language and ways."
End Notes
(1) An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sixth Biennial Iranian Studies
Conference, London, UK, August 3-5, 2006. I would like to thank the panel participant for their
perceptive comments and questions.
(2) A cartoon portraying the life and ways of a cockroach in the daily Iran, the official
newspaper of the Government of Iran published by the Islamic Republic News Agency. It
supports the policies of the government of President Ahmadinejad.
(3) Fieldwork focusing on dynamics of ethno-national identity and Turkish-speaking and
Persian speaking social, cultural and political relations was carried out from February-July.
2006 in Tabriz and Iranian Azerbaijan.
(4) International satellite channels popular in Iran.
(5) The first of the Pahlavi Shahs or kings.
(6) Barrand, Alan 2002. “Emic and Etic”. In Alan Barrand and Jonathan Spencer Encyclopedia
of Social and Cultural Anthropology, pp. 275-280.
(7) Sharg is an independent, occasionally an oppositional daily which has been shut down a
number times by the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran.
(8) Ibid.
(9) For a discussion of etic/emic, insider/outsider perspective see also Ward H. Goodenough
(1970) Description and Comparison in Cultural Anthropology. Chicago: Aldine.
(10) See Ehsan Yarshater (1989) and Yahya Zuka (1973).
(11) Several factors contributed to the high level of concern with territorial integrity at the
turn of the 20th century in Iran. First of these was the currency of ideas and demands,
primarily in Europe, for the creation of an ethno-national homeland or state by various ethnic
or linguistic group within larger political entities before and after WWI. Another important
factor was the witnessing of the dismemberment of the Ottoman territories after WWI in the
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Middle East. Centralization and linguist homogeneity were seen as important ways to
counteract the divisive demands and forces within the multi-ethic, multi-lingual and multicultural political state of Iran.
(12) Iran newspaper, Jomeh edition, Friday 12, May 2006, cartoon by Mana Neyistani.
(13) Hojjatollah Najaf Aghazadeh.
(14) Former President of Islamic Republic of Iran.
(15) Etemad Melli is the organ National Trust Party headed by Mehdi Karrubi, the oppositional
cleric, later one of the leaders of the 2009 Green Movement.
(16) Ali Reza Novin.
(17) Mohammd Kazem Me’marzadeh.
(18) Ayatollah Mohsen Mojtahed-Shabestari. the leader of Friday prayer.
(19) The cost of marriage has become so exorbitant that the government has been assisting in
mass public marriages.
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